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Abstract
In this paper we study the uncertainty in the liability provisions
under the E-Commerce Directive from an economic perspective . Through
the combination of economics of cybersecurity and economic theories
of deterrence and liability we analyse how the uncertainty in Articles
12-15 of the E-Commerce Directive can affect the incentives that
Internet service providers have as regards what level of involvement to
have with data uploaded by users. By looking at the costs and benefits
of investment in security, we show how the existence of uncertainty in
the law can lead to a suboptimal level of investment. Subsequently, we
explore the consequences of changing the current liability provisions
towards either strict liability or no liability at all. We show how
rationally speaking, excessively strict liability could lead to surveillance
of all online content, posing a threat to freedom of expression and
exchange of information. On the other hand no liability would transfer
the responsibility for a safe online space away from hosting services
towards public authorities and civil society groups. The paper intends
to add economic analysis to the legal debate in pursue for more clarity
regarding the interpretation of current rules as well as a better alignment
of incentives of hosting service providers and user preferences so as to
create a safer and fairer online environment.
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1 Introduction
As much as the Internet is an asset for exchanging information, it can
also be used as a resource for illegal and even criminal behaviour, such
as the exchange of content protected by intellectual property (IP) rights,
child pornography, racist and xenophobic content, defamation, incitements
to terrorism, illegal gambling or fake banking services among many other
unlawful behaviours [European Commission, 2012]. With more than 3.2
billion users of the Internet [Internet-Live-Statistics, 2016], the monitoring
and control of all uploads on the Web is economically and practically impossible;
however, some degree of active control and removal of illegal information is
necessary. Given the ubiquitous presence of the Internet in all aspects of
life, an appropriate regulatory framework should aim to achieve an optimal
balance between privacy protection, security assurance, provision of high
quality online services, and freedom of expression.
One of the key issues in achieving this balance concerns liability online,
which is particularly pertinent for information service providers (ISP) who do
not generate online content but provide platforms for exchange of information
among users. Information society services are defined in EU law as “any
service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services” [E-Commerce
Directive, 2000]. In the European Union, the liability of such online intermediaries
is regulated by the E-Commerce Directive (ECD). The Directive was approved
in the context of comprehension of the essential role that such services would
play in modern economy, with the objective of allowing online intermediaries
to become drivers of economic growth. At its conception, the ECD aimed at
aligning regulatory regimes in the European online space, so as to increase
consumers’ trust in online markets and provide companies with legal certainty
that would allow them to operate in the Single Market [European Commission,
1998]. However, while the objective was noble, there are several issues in the
liability provisions which, given their vague wording, have left stakeholders
with a certain degree of uncertainty over the application and limits of the
ECD.
Such uncertainty presents a problem for ISPs and other stakeholders
because it limits the extent to which an ISP should be involved in monitoring
the data uploaded by users. This in turn leaves ISPs with contradictory
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incentives as to what role to play in achieving a secure Internet in the
European Union. Some have argued that it is desirable for ISPs to play
an important role in the fight against criminality online - for instance, David
Cameron stated in 2013 that some services have a “moral duty” to fight
illegal behavior online [Watts, 2013]. At the same time, it seems that the
E-Commerce Directive has not succeeded in achieving the balance that would
both allow ISPs to operate and incentivise them to play an important role
in preventing illegal materials online.
The paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 outlines the
content of the ECD with regard to liability for online actors and introduces
the notion of uncertainty surrounding these liability provisions. In Section
3 we review the literature related to the law and economics of liability. In
Section 4 we develop an economic model on how uncertainty about liability
affects the incentives for hosting platforms to invest in prevention mechanisms.
We outline the practical implications of our model and the resulting debate
in Section 5 and finish with conclusions.
2 Liability of Hosting Services Online
2.1 The liability exemption
The provisions in Articles 12-15 (Section 4) of the ECD define the scope
of the exemption from liability for intermediary service providers, making a
distinction between three types of services: mere conduit (art. 12), caching
(art. 13) and hosting (art. 14). The liability exemption in the ECD
applies only to activities of “mere technical, automatic and passive nature”
where the information society service providers have “neither knowledge
(. . . ) nor control” over content transmitted through or stored on their site.
The conditions for what constitutes a passive service provider are outlined
in Articles 12 and 13 of the ECD. Article 12 refers to the exemption for
‘mere conduit’ that ensure no liability for the: “Information transmitted, on
condition that the provider: (a) does not initiate the transmission; (b) does
not select the receiver of the transmission; and (b) does not select or modify
the information contained in the transmission.”.
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Article 13 adds an exemption for ‘caching’ that obliges Member States to
ensure that: “The service provider is not liable for the automatic, intermediate
and temporary storage of (. . . ) information, performed for the sole purpose
of making more efficient the information’s onward transmission to other
recipients of the service upon their request.” Provided the information is not
modified, access to it and updating is regulated, the technology to obtain
data is used lawfully and any illegal content is removed swiftly, the ISP is
exempt from liability for caching.
Article 14, in turn, regulates hosting services, which are information
society services that store information provided by a recipient of the service
[European Commission, 2003]. The Article states that a hosting service
provider is not liable for the “Information stored at the request of a recipient
of the service, on condition that (a) the provider does not have actual
knowledge of illegal activity [...] or (b) the provider upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to
the information.”
In other words, the hosting service is not responsible for illegal content
uploaded on its site as long as it is not aware of the existence of such content
and that as soon as the company obtains knowledge of unlawful material, it
removes it rapidly from the platform. Finally, Article 15 contains a provision
of “no general obligation to monitor” to be imposed by Member States on
intermediary service providers, allowing however for obligations to inform
authorities of any illegal activities “promptly”.
2.2 Uncertainty in the interpretation of liability provisions
Through the Directive and specifically in Article 14, hosting service providers
are given a ‘safe harbour’ from liability which allows them to function without
the need to supervise or monitor all the content uploaded onto their sites.
However, failing to remove the illegal content “expeditiously” can transform
the hosting service into a publisher or deem it to have facilitated the availability
of the disruptive information; hence the hosting service does still have certain
responsibility.
The liability provisions in the ECD have been considered as an invitation
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to self-regulation [European Commission, 2003], as by removing strict obligation
to monitor while leaving room for liability, they incentivise hosting services
to impose a measure of control upon content uploaded online. Yet this leaves
hosting services with an essential decision to make on how ‘involved’ they
want to be with data on their platforms which, as we will explore in Section
5 may not always be aligned with societal security concerns.
The dilemma stems from the fact that there is a degree of uncertainty
about the liability regime for intermediary service providers. At the heart of
this uncertainty, there is the ambiguous distinction arising from the case law
which defines ‘active’ and ‘passive’ services. In the concluding statements of
paragraph 120 in the Google v Louis Vuitton judgment, the Court of Justice of
the EU specifies that within the meaning of Art.14 of the ECD, the liability
exemption applies to “an Internet referencing service provider in the case
where that service provider has not played an active role of such a kind as
to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data stored”. Thus it appears
that knowledge or control over data stored by hosting platforms is crucial
to making the distinction between active and passive intermediary service
providers 1.
The case law on what constitutes an ‘active’ service provider remains
ambiguous. For instance, Myspace, the American social networking platform,
was found guilty by the Court of Paris of not removing the videos of Mr.
Jean-Yves Lafesse that were posted without his consent. Myspace was qualified
to be an editor of online content due to the pre-defined structure of the
personal pages of users as well as to the presence of profit-generating adverts
on the website. A similar interpretation of the liability rules was reached in
a case involving the video-hosting platform IOL under Italian jurisdiction.
IOL was believed to have “actual knowledge” of the illegal content because it
indexed the information uploaded and allowed users to find videos through
a “related search” service [Benjumea Moreno, 2012]. At the same time, a
French video platform Dailymotion was qualified as a passive hosting service
provider because its involvement with online content (such as re-encoding,
formatting and organising) was purely technical rather than editorial [Court
of Cassation, 2011].
1This position of the ECJ has been further confirmed in the Google Adwords judgment
from March 23, 2010
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Higher involvement or care towards data uploaded can convert a host into
an “active” host and higher monitoring could be considered a determinant of
“actual knowledge” of illegal content, which could suggest that it is optimal
for a hosting service provider to take no preventive action. However, too
little involvement leading to failure to remove content “expeditiously” can
make a hosting service provider liable as well. In turn, the technicalities
in automaticity of engagement with data by hosts and the sheer number of
possible infringements make the issue even more complex and leave room for
misinterpretations of the law.
In this paper, we examine whether such a distinction between passive and
active hosting services corresponds to the economic theories of investment in
cybersecurity. We create a theoretical model of economic analysis of law to
explain the contradictory incentives for hosting service providers created by
legal uncertainty surrounding liability. Our analysis is based on several key
findings from economics of cybersecurity and theories of liability which are
discussed in the following section.
3 Law and Economics of Liability Online
Uncertainty about liability under the E-Commerce Directive is both a legal
and an economic matter and therefore, we combine theories from both disciplines
to understand the issue.
First of all, we build our model on insights from economics of cybersecurity
and in particular the Gordon and Loeb (GL) model, which is the most
important theory in this field to date. The model sets off to examine what
is the optimal level of investment companies should undertake in order to
protect their assets on the web from cybercrime, focusing largely on information
losses. In their model, Gordon and Loeb present the optimal amount to
invest in information security by analysing under a set of assumptions the
relationship between vulnerability and productivity of investment. The model
is a one-period model accounting for monetary loss by breach of security of
the information set, probability of an attempted breach, threat probability,
investment in security and vulnerability. While the GL model talks generally
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about “information security in a computer-based environment” [Gordon and
Loeb, 2002], we extrapolate its logic to analyse the behaviour of hosting
services with respect to illegal content entering their platforms.
In section 4 we adapt the variables and economic logic used by Gordon
and Loeb and derive, in a similar way, the optimal point of investment in
prevention mechanisms, which is “at the point where marginal investment
costs equal the expected marginal benefits derived from the investment”
[Gordon and Loeb, 2002]. Aside from adapting the variables, we adapt as well
some of the assumptions underlying the model so as to better fit the problem
of uncertainty as regards liability. In turn, while Gordon and Loeb’s model
aims at preventing theft of information, ours is related to the hosting service’s
decision as regards preventing illegal material from being uploaded.
Other very relevant theories influencing our work are deterrence, liability,
and cost-allocation theories. In deterrence theory, an actor’s expected utility
derived from committing a certain action can be monetised into a total
monetary utility and there is also a monetary equivalent of a punishment
and the subject’s probability of conviction [Becker et al., 1974]. An actor
will thus decide whether to engage in an (illegal) activity by weighing the
benefits of performing such activity with the costs of doing so [Beccaria, 1767]
[Bentham, 1843]. In the context of uncertainty, assuming hosting service
providers are rational actors, they will decide on their degree of care and
involvement towards data by making an utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, in
a similar way that deterrence theory explains the motivation for a criminal
to engage in an illegal activity.
In theories of liability, economists and lawyers analyse the agency dilemma,
referring to situations in which one person’s actions (agent) impact another
person (principal). In these cases, the principal has an incentive to take
control over the agent’s actions [Shavell, 1980] which in our situation translates
into hosting service providers having an incentive to control their users’
behaviour. Many of these theories also account for a probability of an
accident occurring [Polinsky and Shavell, 2007], which in our context means
the probability of a party being harmed by illegal content being available on
a platform. As has been shown by Shavell [Shavell, 2009], the probability of
an accident is negatively related to the level of care and the optimal level
of care occurs when potential losses are minimized at a minimal cost, given
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the risk of an accident. This translate in our model into the assumption
of rational investment where a higher level of care towards online content
decreases probability of illegal content appearing on the platform.
Our model is also largely influenced by the work of Johnston, who develops
an analysis on how uncertainty can impact the incentives in principal-agent
relations [Johnston, 1990]. Johnston introduces in his model a variable
accounting for effort or precaution level (exercised by the principal or party
in control) that is influenced by random circumstances determining realised
probability of harm and random circumstances determining realised cost of
effort or precautions. While Johnston rationalises the conditions for an actor
to exercise a high level of care from the point of view of the desirability of
uncertainty in a rule of law, we focus on the incentives for the principal (i.e.
the hosting platform) to invest in care towards data.
Lastly, our analysis also builds on the early theory of social costs developed
by Coase. According to Coase, we must take into account the reciprocal
character of the economic activity in question and consider who is in a
position to internalise the costs associated with the economic exchange.
The socially optimal liability regime would thus regulate the market so
as to avoid the more seriously harmful effect that is the one associated
with a higher social cost [Coase, 1960]. The influence of Coase’s theory on
analysing the issue of liability online has already been stressed by Lichtman
and Posner[Lichtman and Posner, 2006]. The authors defend that ISPs
should be strictly liable for the content uploaded onto their platforms as
they are in the best position to decrease illegal content online (which we can
understand as a negative externality). This in turn defends further the idea
that hosting service providers have a responsibility over content uploaded
on their platforms and must be incentivised to do so. In our paper it will
help us reach conclusions over the desirability of uncertainty in the context
of liability online.
These various strains in economic and legal literature about cybersecurity,
liability, deterrence and cost internalisation have all contributed to the theoretical
model of liability of hosting service providers developed in the next section.
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4 Economic Analysis of Liability of Hosting
Service Providers
In this section, we adapt the concepts explored in the Gordon and Loeb model
to fit the problem of uncertainty about liability of hosting service providers.
In the GL model, probability of an attack alters the optimal investment,
while for us uncertainty is an element to be considered when making the
rational decision with regard to the level of care towards data uploaded by
users to a platform/hosting service. We will not enter into exhaustive details
regarding the mathematics behind our model as that is not the main focus
of this study. A more exhaustive technical specification can be found in the
paper by Gordon and Loeb [Gordon and Loeb, 2002].
The optimal level of investment in security or prevention mechanisms by
hosting services depends on the costs of investment, effectiveness of investment,
and costs of facing liability. Additionally, with ambiguous wording of the
liability provisions, the application of the law will be uncertain, which is
an element that enters into play in our model as a random variable outside
the hosting service provider’s control. We have summarised these variables
below:
• z : cost of investment in prevention mechanisms. This refers to any
investments made by hosting services with the aim of preventing illegal
material on a platform from reaching the final user. The most commonly
used mechanisms are filtering techniques (for instance Youtube uses
a software called Content ID to filter copyright-protected material),
monitoring techniques (when resources are deployed for actively searching
for possible breaches in the law within a platform) and notice-and-takedown
procedures (whenever resources are deployed for content removal done
upon notification by a user).
• p : probability of content uploaded by a given user to be illegal and
to bypass the security measures in place. Consequently, this variable
reflects the likelihood that illegal content appears on the hosting platform
and can be accessed by the viewers.
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• cl : this variable comprises any costs incurred by the hosting service if
found liable for material on its platform. They can include litigation
costs, compensation costs, and reputation costs, among others. It is
important to note that these must directly affect the hosting service
(i.e. costs borne by a victim of the illegal content do not fall into this
category).
• u : random element affecting the probability of a platform being found
liable. Since the wording of the liability provisions is vague, this variable
captures the various circumstances depending on the interpretation of
“actual knowledge”, “active service”, “passive service”, and “expeditiously”
from the ECD. By its very nature, the variable’s behaviour is unknown,
which could affect the expected outcome of a court decision either to
the detriment or benefit of the hosting service provider.
The benefits of a higher investment in security are modelled as the decrease
in potential losses. Overall, this means the difference between the potential
loses of a hosting service provider who does not invest in prevention mechanisms
and the potential losses of a hosting service provider who does invest in
prevention mechanisms.
Additionally, we include some assumptions in order to draw conclusions
from the subsequent derivation. These differ somewhat from the Gordon and
Loeb model:
• Assumption 1
The liability probability function must be between 0 and 1
0 < S(z∗, u) < 1
• Assumption 2
For all uncertainty u,
S(0, u) = u
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• Assumption 3
For u = 0 the function S(z, 0) is decreasing and convex
d
dz
S(z, 0) < 0
d2
dz2
s(z, 0) > 0
This means that a higher investment decreases the potential losses by
decreasing the probability of illegal material entering the web. This condition
is necessary to reflect rationality in the investment decision, for instance
prevention mechanisms being effective. This is essential as we are assuming
that hosting services are rational actors and therefore the incentive to prevent
illegal material on the web comes from an economic gain (decrease in potential
losses) and not from an altruistic interest in decreasing illegal material available
online.
From these variables we can derive the equation for benefit from investment
in prevention mechanisms as the difference in the potential loses with different
levels of investment:
[u− S(z, u)] ∗ cl ∗ p− z
(1)
With positive value of investment z and in the presence of uncertainty,
the point at which investment in security optimizes probability of being
found liable is found by calculating the first order condition of the following
function:
−S(z∗, u) ∗ cl ∗ p = 1
(2)
This can be rewritten as:
−Sz(z∗, u) = 1/(cl ∗ p)
(3)
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The function above can be understood as the marginal productivity of
higher investment in security. More specifically, it illustrates the relationship
between the potential decreases in costs (litigation costs derived from liability
for illegal content online) associated with an additional investment in prevention
costs.
While we will not focus on the mathematics that allow to define the
function S(z, u) in practice, in the following sections we discuss the model
as seen from the perspective of the legal debate about an optimal liability
regime, in light of court rulings on liability of hosting services.
5 Implication and Debate
5.1 The effect of uncertainty
The presence of uncertainty affects the optimal level of investment by altering
the equation in the partial derivative of the liability probability function.
Recalling that with some degree of liability the problem for the hosting
service has to do with how to prevent potential higher litigation costs, it
is easy to see that with some undefined elements in the law, having targeted
prevention mechanisms in place will be difficult for hosting service providers.
When uncertainty enters the equation its random nature cannot guarantee
that investment in prevention mechanisms will be rational or effective. This
occurs because of many errors that are introduced with uncertainty. For
example, a hosting service may fail to prevent illegal material on the web
simply by failing to identify what constitutes “illegal”. Even if legality is well
assessed, notice-and-takedown processess may not be “expeditious” enough,
hence creating an error in the effectiveness of the measures in preventing
possible. This is supported by examples of cases mentioned in section 2
where higher monitoring could be a determinant of actual knowledge and
higher involvement can convert a host into an “active host”. The incentive
to invest is harmed no matter how effective the prevention mechanism may
be. In turn, the liability probability function including the element u makes
it so that the level of investment z may not lead to the desired minimization
of potential losses cl ∗ p.
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S(z∗, u) = −1/(cl ∗ p)
(4)
The implication to society in terms of achieving a secure Internet is that
with no definite answer as to what is optimal, hosting service providers will
likely leave decisions on the level of care to the expectations they may have of
what outcome is most likely in court. In the context of the ECD, which aims
at harmonising the rules across the EU, leaving a decision on investment levels
to be determined by expectations which may vary across different Member
States is certainly suboptimal for stakeholders.
Furthermore, in the current setting with the vague distinction between
active and passive hosting services, it is rational to assume that, in a court
hearing, higher involvement with online content could be a determinant of
being an “active” host. This de-incentivises further investment in prevention
costs, as higher investment in z cannot guarantee lower costs of litigation in
spite of the relationship with probability described in Assumption 3.
5.2 Removing the element of uncertainty
There is currently much legal debate as to what wording in Articles 12-15
would benefit stakeholders of hosting service providers by decreasing uncertainty.
It appears that further specification of concepts such as “expeditiously” or
“actual knowledge” would in practice be very hard to define and could even
be detrimental. To illustrate, the concept “expeditiously” would probably
need to include some kind of time measurement to reduce uncertainty. As a
Commission working paper states, any specification of a time frame would
probably turn out to be too short or too long. For example, the streaming of
a live sports event would require immediate take-down to avoid any economic
damage, while other type of content would allow for higher flexibility. [European
Commission, 2012]. While we leave to lawyers the debate as to what wording
would clarify the current liability regime, in this section we explore the
economic consequences of removing uncertainty. In this setting, we study
two extreme hypothetical situations: removing uncertainty towards strict
liability or else removing uncertainty by completely removing any link of
hosting service providers to liability.
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5.2.1 Strict liability for hosting service providers
If strict liability were imposed, hosting services would find themselves in
a setting were their incentives to invest are extremely high. Any possible
illegal content on a platform would become the hosting service provider’s
responsibility and hence the hosting service would bear all economic costs.
In the framework of our model, the new problem transforms the probability
liability function in the following way:
S(z) = −1/cl ∗ p
(5)
Given Assumption 3, where we assume higher investment in prevention
mechanisms to be decreasing in relation to probability of illegal material
entering the platform, in this equation there exists an optimal level of investment
z∗. By removing uncertainty, we allow for the existence of an economically
rational solution as ISPs have a targeted approach to preventing illegal
material on their platforms.
While this would allow optimal decision-making, it also hampers the main
reason the E-Commerce Directive was put in place in the first place: to
allow economic activity online to flourish and the exchange of information.
By making hosting service providers strictly liable, only those with more
resources could afford to allow users to exchange material on their platforms
as prevention mechanisms are expensive and controlling all activity online
is practically impossible. There are therefore two dangers associated to the
idea of strict liability for hosting service providers: pushing small hosting
service providers out of the Internet and a threat to freedom of speech.
Smaller platforms would likely not be able to bear neither the very high
cost of prevention nor the potential litigation costs hence we would see a
decrease in the number of smaller players, with the harm that this implies
for innovation and the sharing of content for users. At the same time, if
hosting service providers were in control of all possible information uploaded,
there is a risk that too much information would be prevented from reaching
the platforms. In such a situation, sharing of all ideas online would become
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subject to monitoring, whether illegal or not. This of course poses a threat
to freedom of expression and exchange of information, which are rights
enshrined in Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
5.2.2 No liability of hosting service providers
On the other hand, if no liability were imposed on a hosting service provider,
there would also be an optimal solution to the equation mentioned above.
When the hosting service providers need not bear the cost of potential
litigation, the optimal solution would be not to invest at all in prevention of
illegal content online.
S(z∗, 0) = 0
(6)
While this is optimal (i.e. least expensive) for hosting service providers, a
move towards less liability would exclude hosting service providers from the
fight against illegal material online. Taking into account societal preference
for a safe Internet, no liability for hosts would likely mean that the costs of
preventing online content from reaching the viewers would be borne by either
public authorities or private activist groups.
From both economic and legal point of view, such an outcome would be
problematic. On the one hand, involving public authorities in overseeing
online content would raise issues of breach of privacy, as seen for example
in the public outrage at NSA actions in the United States after the 9/11
terrorist attacks. On the other hand, relying solely on social activism could
lead to under- or over-surveillance and would likely result in increased costs
of litigation for hosts, viewers and potential victims of illegal content.
6 Conclusion
The discussion presented in this paper reveals the numerous facets of the
problems faced by hosting services, law-makers and users regarding illegal
content online. Our analysis reveals the difficulties in reconciling the need for
legal certainty with the creation of an environment where users are protected,
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while at the same time allowing hosts to operate their businesses profitably.
Given the diverging interpretations of the current legal framework under
the ECD, we attempt to contribute to the discussion about an optimal level of
liability for hosting services. By applying a number of different theories and
specifically focusing on the relevance of the GL model of cybersecurity, we
showed that an optimal level of investment in prevention of illegal material is
difficult, if not impossible to define, given the random nature of uncertainty.
This in turn leaves the important decision on the level of involvement towards
online content to the expectations of hosting service providers about the
outcome of potential litigation. For the purpose of achieving a safe cyberspace
across the European Union, such a framework remains suboptimal.
We show that from an economic point of view, any change towards the
extremes of either strict liability or no-liability would not be desirable. Strict
liability would turn the Internet into a space fully controlled by hosting
service providers which would threaten the fundamental freedom of expression
guaranteed to EU citizens. Besides, it would likely force smaller hosting
service providers out of the market. Yet a move towards no-liability would
imply hosting service providers would not participate in the costs of the fight
against illegal behaviour online.
From both economic and legal points of view, implications of our analysis
are twofold. Firstly, clarity is needed about distinction between active and
passive hosting service providers, preferably expanding the number of hosts
categorised as passive. This would give breathing space to smaller hosting
platforms with less funds available for screening of online content by extending
the liability exemption. Secondly, when looking at costs and benefits of the
legal framework, the situation of users should be taken into account alongside
the incentives for hosting service providers. A more balanced approach would
allow for a fairer, safer, and more socially optimal liability framework for
online platforms.
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